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Mayola Williams sued Philip Morris, the manufacturer of Marlbo-
ros, for the wrongful death (from lung cancer) of her husband Jesse, 
who had been a lifelong Marlboro smoker.1  Despite warnings from 
the federal government, family, and many others, Jesse Williams had 
smoked because he allegedly believed Philip Morris’s claims that 
smoking had not been proven to be dangerous.2  An Oregon jury 
awarded Ms. Williams $821,000 in compensatory damages (reduced to 
$521,000 because of a cap on pain and suffering) and $79.5 million in 
punitive damages (of which sixty percent was diverted to the Oregon 
government3).4  The punitive award was upheld by Oregon’s appellate 
courts and was reaffirmed on remand after the United States Supreme 
Court ordered it to be reconsidered in light of the Court’s ruling in 
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell.5  The Oregon 
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1 Williams v. Philip Morris Inc., 48 P.3d 824, 828 (Or. Ct. App. 2002), vacated sub 
nom. Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Williams, 540 U.S. 801 (2003). 
2 Id. at 829. 
3 See OR. REV. STAT. § 31.735 (2007) (directing sixty percent of all punitive dam-
age awards into the “Criminal Injuries Compensation Account”). 
4 Williams, 48 P.3d at 828. 
5 Williams, 540 U.S. at 801 (citing State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 
U.S. 408 (2003)). 
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Supreme Court upheld the award under Campbell because Philip Mor-
ris’s behavior was “extraordinarily reprehensible.”6 
A sharply divided United States Supreme Court reversed, finding 
that the punitive damages award against Philip Morris violated the 
company’s constitutional right to due process.7  Justice Breyer’s major-
ity opinion ruled for the first time that a factfinder must be instructed 
that it may not increase punitive damages because of harm caused to 
nonparties to a lawsuit.8  Such harm is, Breyer conceded, relevant to 
the availability of punitive damages but may play no role in determin-
ing the amount of a punitive award.9  The majority declined to consid-
er a separate question—whether the one-hundred-to-one ratio of pu-
nitive to compensatory awards in Williams flouted the constitutional 
standards of BMW of North America v. Gore—presumably because it ex-
pected the quantum to be reduced on remand.10 
In dissent, Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas, 
noted that Philip Morris’s proposed jury instruction—the rejection of 
which was the basis for its appeal—itself approved consideration of 
harm suffered by nonparties, and that, therefore, the majority’s ruling 
did not respect the case’s procedural posture.11  Justice Thomas, ag-
hast at yet another use of substantive due process, concluded that the 
Court’s jurisprudence on punitive damages “is ‘insusceptible of prin-
cipled application.’”12  Justice Stevens, writing separately, agreed with 
Justice Ginsburg that the defendant’s appeal precluded the majority’s 
ruling and added that he saw “no reason why an interest in punishing 
a wrongdoer ‘for harming persons who are not before the court’ 
should not be taken into consideration when assessing the appropri-
ate sanction for reprehensible conduct.”13 
I have long believed that the most coherent federal-constitutional 
justification for judicial control of state punitive damages awards is the 
Eighth Amendment’s “excessive fines” clause.14  Unfortunately, this 
 
6 Williams v. Philip Morris Inc., 127 P.3d 1165, 1177, 1181-82 (Or. 2006), vacated 
sub nom. Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346 (2007). 
7 Williams, 549 U.S. at 353-55. 
8 Id. at 355. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. at 352 (citing BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996)). 
11 Id. at 362-64 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
12 Id. at 361 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting BMW, 517 U.S. at 599 (Scalia, J., dis-
senting)). 
13 Id. at 358 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Id. at 349 (majority opinion)). 
14 See Michael I. Krauss, Punitive Damages and the Supreme Court:  A Tragedy in Five 
Acts, ENGAGE, Oct. 2003, at 118, 119-20. 
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view was rejected by a majority of the Court in Browning-Ferris Industries 
of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.15  In an interesting footnote to his 
Williams dissent, however, Justice Stevens returned to the Eighth 
Amendment.16 
In any case, after Williams, judges must tell jurors to think about 
harm to nonparties in deciding whether the defendant’s conduct me-
rits a punitive award.  But then jurors cannot think about that harm 
when determining the amount of punitive damages; to calculate puni-
tive damages they must somehow consider only the harm to the plain-
tiff.  How jurors are to clear their minds between these two steps is 
unclear—what is clear is that this issue will be back before the Court. 
My own view is that awards of punitive damages almost always vi-
olate a key characteristic of tort law by breaching the private order-
ing/public ordering divide.  If I am correct, the role Professor Dan 
Markel reserves for punitive damages is incompatible with tort law’s 
nature.  I wish to first summarize that view and then comment on “mi-
cro” aspects of Markel’s interesting paper. 
I.  PUBLIC ORDERING VS. PRIVATE ORDERING 
Political legal philosophers conventionally distinguish between 
aspects of law that regulate private ordering and aspects of law that re-
gulate public ordering.17  Private ordering is between citizens.  Property law, 
contract law, tort law, and family law exist to regulate this ordering.  Pub-
lic ordering is between citizens and the State.  Criminal law, administra-
tive law, tax law, and welfare law are components of public ordering. 
Public ordering is the only kind of legal order in totalitarian socie-
ties.  In such a society there is no such thing as property as Americans 
experience it.  Nor is there freedom of contract between consenting 
adults—private contracts would allow self-determination without state 
supervision and would thus be impermissible.  Importantly, to the ex-
tent it is totalitarian, a state can have no tort law:  there’s no such 
thing as a private wrong because every wrong is a wrong against the state. 
On the other hand, tort law is an essential component of private 
ordering.  It is contract law’s necessary counterpart—regulating non-
 
15 492 U.S. 257 (1989). 
16 See Williams, 549 U.S. at 360 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“I continue to agree 
with . . . those scholars who have concluded that the Excessive Fines Clause is applica-
ble to punitive damages awards regardless of who receives the ultimate payout.”).  In-
deed, the fact that most of the punitive award in this case accrued to the state makes 
the analogy to a fine even stronger than in Browning-Ferris. 
17 See generally Michael I. Krauss, Tort Law and Private Ordering, 35 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 
623 (1991).   
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contractual interaction among humans.  This rectification of private 
imbalances takes place without the intervention of prisons and police, 
quintessential components of public ordering.  As part of private or-
dering, tort law has the several implications. 
First, without a wrong, there is no imbalance requiring private re-
dress.  An efficient businessman who through acceptable techniques 
outcompetes his competitor owes the latter nothing.  The causing of a 
loss incurs no tort liability; rather, it is the wrongful causing of a loss 
that creates the requirement of compensation.18 
Similarly, wrongful behavior without damages creates no correc-
tive justice duty.  Driving home while drunk is negligent (wrongful) 
and may garner public outrage, but if a drunk makes it home without 
hitting anyone, she has no tort liability.  Her crime is a matter for pub-
lic ordering, which carries with it all of the protections to which an 
individual is entitled when the might of the state is directed against 
her.  It is the conjunction of wrongfulness and the harm caused the-
reby that creates the tort obligation.19 
Finally, when a tort occurs, compensation must be full.20  Com-
pensation is a function of damages wrongfully incurred rather than 
that of the extent of wrongdoing.  A tortfeasor who negligently burns 
down a $50,000 house is liable in tort to pay $50,000 to make the 
homeowner whole.  If that house was worth $1 million, she would 
likewise be required to pay $1 million to its owner.  This is not because 
tort law favors the rich, but because tort equally respects the poor and 
the rich.  Each tort victim has the right to be returned to her former 
state by the tortfeasor who wrongfully harmed her—that far but no 
farther.  Similarly, rich tortfeasors owe full compensation, as do poor 
 
18 This is of course Aristotle’s conception of corrective justice as first sketched in 
ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. 5, ch. 4, at 120-23 (Martin Ostwald trans., 1962).  
For a modern description, see ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 56-83 
(1995).  Corrective justice theory is so orthodox that jurists who depart from it are 
noteworthy.  See, e.g., John C.P. Goldberg, Misconduct, Misfortune, and Just Compensation:  
Weinstein on Torts, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2034, 2037 (1997) (contrasting Judge Weinstein’s 
jurisprudence to “the traditional measure of relief—full compensation—as the norm 
of justice in mass tort cases”). 
19 See generally Ernest J. Weinrib, Causation and Wrongdoing, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
407 (1987). 
20 See Michael I. Krauss & Jeremy Kidd, Collateral Source and Tort’s Soul, 46 U. 
LOUISVILLE L. REV. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 32-39), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1272678 (applying this principle to misguided tort reform 
efforts to reduce recovery through the abolition of the collateral source rule). 
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tortfeasors.21  Public law may distinguish in many ways between the rich 
and the poor (e.g., with regard to “progressive” income tax rates or crim-
inal sentencing guidelines), but private law is properly blind to wealth. 
Punitive damages as currently understood do not fit into this 
scheme of tort law because, by definition, punitive damages are over-
compensatory.  Nevertheless, a different conception of punitive dam-
ages was present at the conception of tort law.  Under that conception 
punitive damages continue to have a legitimate but extremely limited 
role in tort. 
II.  PUNITIVE DAMAGES’ HISTORICALLY LIMITED ROLE 
England’s common law courts first awarded punitive damages in 
the eighteenth century at a time when the institutional structure of 
criminal law enforcement was quite primitive.22  Plaintiffs invariably 
served as private attorneys general and collected “penalties.”  In fact, 
quite a few such “punitive” damage awards were in reality compensa-
tory.  As Judge Richard Posner explains in Mathias v. Accor Economy 
Lodging, Inc., 
An example is deliberately spitting in a person’s face, a criminal assault 
but because minor readily deterrable by the levying of what amounts to a 
civil fine through a suit for damages for the tort of battery.  Compensa-
tory damages would not do the trick in such a case, and this for three 
reasons:  because they are difficult to determine in the case of acts that 
inflict largely dignitary harms; because in the spitting case they would be 
too slight to give the victim an incentive to sue, and he might decide in-
stead to respond with violence—and an age-old purpose of the law of 
torts is to provide a substitute for violent retaliation against wrongful in-
jury—and because to limit the plaintiff to compensatory damages would 
enable the defendant to commit the offensive act with impunity pro-
vided that he was willing to pay, and again there would be a danger that 
his act would incite a breach of the peace by his victim.
23
 
The premise for Judge Posner’s observation may be the fact that 
tort law provided no subjective damages (damages for the outrage to 
one’s dignity) to victims of dignitary harms who suffered no neurolog-
 
21 Of course, if the tortfeasor is so poor that he has insufficient assets to compen-
sate the victim (and insufficient insurance to make him solvent), then he cannot be 
adequately reached in tort.   
22 See Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 1, 12-20 (1982) (tracing the origins of punitive damages in Anglo-
American law). 
23 Mathias v. Accor Econ. Lodging, Inc., 347 F.3d 672, 676-77 (7th Cir. 2003). 
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ical pain.24  “Punitive” damages in these dignitary cases were not puni-
tive at all.  They remedied a loophole in tort law in cases where dam-
ages were grossly undercompensatory.25 
An excellent contemporary illustration of this function for puni-
tive damages is the aforementioned Seventh Circuit decision, Mathias 
v. Accor Economy Lodging, Inc.26  In Mathias, a motel knowingly rented 
rooms infested with bed bugs while fumigation took place, instead of 
closing down for a few days and losing rental income.27  The plaintiffs, 
who were bitten, claimed that the defendant was guilty of “willful and 
wanton conduct,” making it liable for punitive damages under Illinois 
law.28  The jury agreed and, although it granted only $5000 in com-
pensatory damages, awarded $186,000 in punitive damages.29  The 
plaintiffs’ emotional distress was arguably substantial, but that distress 
could not be the object of compensatory damages.30  In reality, the 
punitive award was compensatory.  Indeed, American common law’s 
lack of a “loser pays” rule ensures undercompensation of the wrong-
fully injured.  As Judge Posner noted in Mathias, the “American rule” 
enables strategic behavior by wealthy and culpable defendants: 
[A wealthy defendant can] mount an extremely aggressive defense 
against suits such as this and by doing so . . . make litigating against it 
very costly, which in turn may make it difficult for the plaintiffs to find a 
lawyer willing to handle their case, involving as it does only modest 
stakes, for the usual 33-40 percent contingent fee.
31
 
Today, we have paid attorneys general and local prosecutors, and 
fines are collected in public ordering settings.  Indeed, today we have 
criminal offenses where in the past public ordering would never have 
 
24 See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron, Law’s Expressive Value in Combating Cyber Gender 
Harassment, 108 MICH. L. REV. 373, 393 (2009) (“[N]ineteenth-century tort law . . . re-
fus[ed] to recognize claims mainly pursued by women, such as those for emotional dis-
tress.”). 
25 Cf. Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Augmented Awards:  The Efficient Evolution of Punitive 
Damages, 51 LA. L. REV. 3, 40-58 (1990) (identifying situations when punitive damages 
could be used to reach efficient results). 
26 347 F.3d 672. 
27 Id. at 674. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 Will the plaintiffs ever again enjoy sleeping in hotel rooms or ever sleep soundly 
in such rooms again? 
31 Id. at 677. 
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been involved.32  In addition to tort damages, the hotel in Mathias was 
subject to both criminal prosecution and a regulatory “death penal-
ty”—the removal of its permit to operate a hotel.33 
The prosecution of criminal offenses, however, is subject to consti-
tutional protections, including Fifth Amendment protection against 
self-incrimination and double jeopardy,34 Eighth Amendment protec-
tion against excessive fines,35 and the Article I prohibition of ex post 
facto laws subjecting individuals to federal prosecution for crimes not 
previously clearly defined.36  A tort trial today offers none of those pro-
tections:  compulsory discovery compels self-incrimination, one tort 
may lead to many successful lawsuits, and the grounds for liability may 
be utterly unknown before judgment.37  Extension of punitive damag-
es beyond the rectification of “tort loopholes” would, therefore, be an 
abuse of the current public/private divide. 
Such abuse occurs when punitive damages are sought in noncom-
pensatory settings, but it also occurs in other areas of the law.  “Civil 
penalties” sought by the state for having one’s car photographed by a 
speed camera allow for prosecution without due process (the state 
need not prove that the speeder is the defendant) and are a mockery 
of the criminal burden of proof (the defendant cannot recall the con-
text of the speeding to justify it, since he is notified of the photo only 
weeks later; and he must identify anyone else driving his car in order 
to avoid liability).38  Similarly, efforts by states to exact criminal pu-
nishment without jury trial through civil contempt proceedings have 
been properly repressed by the Supreme Court as intruding on public 
ordering.39  Implementation of public policy through punitive damag-
es awards similarly awaits satisfactory Supreme Court remedy. 
 
32 See, e.g., HARVEY SILVERGLATE, THREE FELONIES A DAY:  HOW THE FEDS TARGET 
THE INNOCENT (2009) (describing overlegislation and overenforcement of public of-
fenses at the federal level).  
33 Mathias, 347 F.3d at 678. 
34 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
35 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
36 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9. 
37 See, e.g., TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 466 (1993) 
(upholding tort liability for slander of title, previously unknown as a tort in West Vir-
ginia). 
38 See, e.g., Kevin P. Shannon, Speeding Towards Disaster:  How Cleveland’s Traffic 
Cameras Violate the Ohio Constitution, 55 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 607, 620-21 (2007) (describing 
Cleveland’s speed camera enforcement ordinances). 
39 See Int’l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 837-38 
(1994) (relying on several considerations to determine that the parties held in con-
tempt “were entitled to a criminal jury trial”). 
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Even when punitive damages are in fact compensatory, as in Ma-
thias, they may no longer be needed for complete deterrence.  Judge 
Posner virtually recognized this in Mathias when he validated the pu-
nitive damages award for exposing guests to bedbugs.  Though he 
upheld the award for corrective justice reasons, he wondered out loud 
whether deterrence required it: 
[I]t would have been helpful had the parties presented evidence con-
cerning the regulatory or criminal penalties to which the defendant ex-
posed itself by deliberately exposing its customers to a substantial risk of 
being bitten by bedbugs.  That is an inquiry recommended by the Su-
preme Court.  But we do not think its omission invalidates the award.  
We can take judicial notice that deliberate exposure of hotel guests to 
the health risks created by insect infestations exposes the hotel’s owner 
to sanctions under Illinois and Chicago law that in the aggregate are 
comparable in severity to the punitive damage award in this case.
40
 
III.  MODERN PUNITIVE DAMAGES AND PRIVATE ORDERING 
The modern growth of substantial punitive awards is a product of 
confusion between private and public ordering.  It is arguably one 
reason why four states’ supreme courts have declared that their com-
mon law of tort does not permit punitive damages.41  A fifth state has 
abolished punitive damages by statute.42  Quite a few other states have 
statutory caps on punitive damages.43  Of course, many states have no 
limitation on punitive damages.  Yet, in all states punitive damages 
were “covertly compensatory” as in Mathias until the great torts explo-
sion of the 1980s.  Until 1976, the highest punitive damages award was 
 
40 Mathias v. Accor Econ. Lodging, Inc., 347 F.3d 672, 678 (7th Cir. 2003) (cita-
tions omitted). 
41 See Int’l Harvester Credit Corp. v. Seale, 518 So. 2d 1039, 1041 (La. 1988) (“Un-
der Louisiana law, punitive or other ‘penalty’ damages are not allowable unless ex-
pressly authorized by statute.”); Distinctive Printing & Packaging Co. v. Cox, 443 
N.W.2d 566, 574 (Neb. 1989) (“[P]unitive, vindictive, or exemplary damages contra-
vene Neb. Const. art. VII, § 5 . . . .”); Dailey v. N. Coast Life Ins. Co., 919 P.2d 589, 590 
(Wash. 1996) (noting the “court’s long-standing rule prohibiting punitive damages 
without express legislative authorization”); Fleshner v. Technical Commc’ns Corp., 575 
N.E.2d 1107, 1112 (Mass. 1991) (“Punitive damages are not allowed in this Common-
wealth unless expressly authorized by statute.”).   
42 See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:16 (2009) (“No punitive damages shall be 
awarded in any action, unless otherwise provided by statute.”).   
43 In my home state of Virginia, the cap is $350,000.  VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-38.1 
(2007).  This is quite typical nationwide. 
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$250,000,44 a sobering observation in light of recent multibillion-dollar 
judgments. 
Today, massive punitive damage awards in products liability and 
intentional tort cases have blurred the public/private divide.  Thomas 
Colby has described, in a nutshell, the intellectual fog created by the 
Supreme Court’s refusal to address this problem: 
The obvious objection to punitive damages is that it seems clearly un-
constitutional to punish a defendant with a sanction that the Supreme 
Court concedes is conceptually and functionally indistinguishable from a 
criminal punishment without affording the procedural safeguards that 
the Constitution guarantees to criminal defendants.  That objection has 
plagued punitive damages for well over a century.  Yet the Supreme 
Court has never confronted it.  Instead, the Court has consistently sides-
tepped the issue with the assurance that punitive damages must be con-
stitutional because they predate the Constitution and the Framers mani-
fested no intention to displace them.
45
 
Yet, as we have seen, pre-Constitution punitive damages were qualita-
tively different from today’s punitive damages.  Today’s punitive dam-
ages awards are usually frank exercises in public policymaking, while 
pre-Constitution damages were either a product of an underdeve-
loped public ordering system or disguised compensation for damages 
that, for historical reasons, tort law had denied. 
IV.  MARKEL’S MISSTEPS 
Dan Markel, in two recent articles, has attempted to provide a 
“principled application” of punitive damages (which he calls “retribu-
tive damages”), the lack of which was condemned by Justices Thomas 
and Stevens in Williams.46  In Retributive Damages, Markel argues that 
punitive damages are uniquely qualified—and should be restruc-
tured—“to advance the public’s interest in retributive justice.”47  In 
How Should Punitive Damages Work?, Markel focuses on the nuts and 
 
44 David G. Owen, Problems in Assessing Punitive Damages Against Manufacturers of 
Defective Products, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1982). 
45 Thomas B. Colby, Clearing the Smoke from Philip Morris v. Williams:  The Past, 
Present, and Future of Punitive Damages, 118 YALE L.J. 392, 395 (2008) (footnotes omit-
ted); see also Benjamin C. Zipursky, A Theory of Punitive Damages, 84 TEX. L. REV. 105, 
131 (2005) (noting the Supreme Court’s “disinclination to engage the civil-criminal 
gestalt”). 
46 Dan Markel, How Should Punitive Damages Work?, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1383 (2009) 
[hereinafter Markel, How Should Punitive Damages Work?]; Dan Markel, Retributive Dam-
ages:  A Theory of Punitive Damages as Intermediate Sanction, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 239 
(2009) [hereinafter Markel, Retributive Damages]. 
47 Markel, Retributive Damages, supra note 46, at 239. 
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bolts of the retributive system he favors, including its procedural safe-
guards,48 effects on insurance markets,49 and regulation of settle-
ments.50  Both of Markel’s articles outline a “pragmatic form of redress 
against anti-social misconduct” by “wealthy and powerful individuals.”51 
Markel uses yet another complicated multifactor test52 to deter-
mine when and within what limits punitive damages should be availa-
ble.  He recommends using a percentage of the defendant’s wealth.53  
He adds suggested jury instructions as an appendix to his first article.54  
In the second article, he crafts a set of procedural protections for the 
“intermediate sanction” that is punitive damages55 and appends 
slightly modified jury instructions.56 
It should be obvious that I do not find Markel’s theoretical de-
fense and explication of punitive damages tenable.  I reject his pre-
mise that punitive damages are authorized in any but quasi-
compensation cases, whether to pay for moral offenses or for attor-
neys’ fees.57  Retributive use of punitive damages represents, to me, a 
pollution of tort law by public ordering principles.58 
Though I reject Markel’s overall strategy, for those who find it pa-
latable, I note several specific problems with several of his tactics. 
 
48 Markel, How Should Punitive Damages Work?, supra note 46, at 1423-25. 
49 Id. at 1463-69. 
50 Id. at 1471-78. 
51 Markel, Retributive Damages, supra note 46, at 335.  The desire to limit punitive 
damages to suits against the rich is refreshingly honest, if empirically unneeded—the 
poor are unlikely to be sued in tort and even less likely to have the wherewithal to pay 
punitive damages. 
52 For a chronicle of the rise of balancing tests in constitutional adjudication and a 
critical discussion of its merits, see T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age 
of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943 (1987). 
53 Markel, Retributive Damages, supra note 46, at 248. 
54 Id. at 336-40. 
55 Markel, How Should Punitive Damages Work?, supra note 46, at 1435-62. 
56 Id. at 1479-84. 
57 It should be noted that the portion of the Williams punitive award left to the 
plaintiff, after deduction of the state’s “take,” is meant in part to compensate for legal 
fees payable under the “American Rule.”  See OR. REV. STAT. § 31.735(1)(a) (2007) 
(“Forty percent shall be paid to the prevailing party.  The attorney for the prevailing 
party shall be paid out of the amount allocated under this paragraph . . . .”).  Clearly, 
the Oregon statute recognizes that punitive awards are in part compensatory and im-
plies that the part of the punitive award that is not compensatory does not justly be-
long to the victim. 
58 I share the view of Martin Redish and Andrew Mathews that “the concept of a 
distinct category of ‘private’ punishment for ‘private’ wrongs is, at its foundation, in-
coherent . . . .”  Martin H. Redish & Andrew L. Mathews, Why Punitive Damages are Un-
constitutional, 53 EMORY L.J. 1, 19, n.90 (2004). 
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First, Markel’s notion that punitive damages should represent a 
percentage (between 0.5% and 10%) of a defendant’s net worth—i.e., 
that wealthier defendants should pay higher punitive awards ceteris pa-
ribus—is in my opinion subject to severe Due Process problems.59  
Crucial both to tort law and to our understanding of equality as a 
component of the rule of law, Aristotelian corrective justice holds 
that, unlike liability, “sanctions [(e.g., punitive damages)] should be 
based on the wrong done rather than on the status of the defen-
dant.”60  If a person is to be punished, it should be for what she has 
done, not for who she is, even if she is a large corporation.  Of course, 
if tort law is meant to deter, not to correct private injustice, then some 
have argued that the rich need greater deterrents than do the poor.61  
Does Markel wish to be identified with those who see tort law as quin-
tessentially deterrent (and who therefore must make the case that 
criminal law, tax law, securities law, and the other components of pub-
lic law are somehow insufficiently deterrent in their combined penal-
ties on culpable corporations)? 
In any case, the use of a defendant’s net worth to help determine 
punitive damages is theoretically troubling and insufficiently thought 
through by Markel.  As Judge Posner indicated in Mathias, net worth is 
not a particularly powerful measure of a corporation’s resources.  It is 
essentially an accounting artifact that reflects the allocation of owner-
ship between equity and debt claimants.  A firm financed largely by 
equity investors has a large net worth, while an otherwise-identical 
firm “financed largely by debt may have only a small net worth be-
cause accountants treat debt as a liability.”62  Markel’s proposal, if im-
plemented, would lead corporations to favor debt over equity at the 
margin and to dole out more in dividends than otherwise would be 
the case, so as to lower their expected outlays of punitive damages.  To 
my knowledge, no sound philosophical or economic reason exists to 
create such an incentive.  Markel hopes to avoid this problem by using 
an undefined term, “net value,” to determine—along with the degree 
 
59 See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 591 (1996) (Breyer, J., concur-
ring) (arguing that apportioning punitive damages to wealth “provides an open-ended 
basis for inflating awards when the defendant is wealthy”); Zazú Designs v. L’Oréal, 
S.A., 979 F.2d 499, 509 (7th Cir. 1992) (“Corporate size is a reason to magnify damages 
only when the wrongs of larger firms are less likely to be punished; yet judges rarely 
have any reason to suppose this, and the court in this case had none.”) 
60 Mathias v. Accor Econ. Lodging, Inc., 347 F.3d 672, 676 (7th Cir. 2003). 
61 See, e.g., Jennifer H. Arlen, Should Defendants’ Wealth Matter?, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 
413, 422-23 (1992) (arguing that “wealthy defendants should be required to take more 
care than less wealthy defendants” to realize society’s “optimal level of care”). 
62 Mathias, 347 F.3d at 677-78.  
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of culpability—the quantum of punitive damages for corporations.63  
But “net value,” however it is defined,64 is no more attractive than “net 
worth,” in my opinion:  why should a corporation that wastes social re-
sources while committing evil deeds pay less in punitive damages than 
a corporation whose tremendous contributions to consumer surplus 
have positively affected its takeover price? 
Second, Markel’s rules for dealing with criminal prosecution and 
civil litigation for the same tortious behavior pose serious problems.  
Markel advocates that the “intermediate sanction” of punitive damag-
es would be credited against any fines assessed against the company, 
and if a company has already been criminally convicted for relevant 
conduct, such conviction would preclude any claim for punitive dam-
ages based on the underlying conduct.65  Obviously, Markel offers this 
solution as one way to resolve the constitutional conundrum of double 
jeopardy—how to prevent the defendant from “paying twice” for the 
same crime?  But the political machinations involved in the decision 
to, for example, delay a criminal prosecution—so that the “prize” for 
misbehavior can accrue to a politically favored private party and not to 
the state—are too numerous and severe to contemplate seriously.  In-
deed, occult influence can run in both directions:  one can anticipate 
cases where innocent corporations anxious to avoid confiscatory puni-
tive damages decide to plead guilty to a crime they did not commit.  
How all of this is compatible with justice is anyone’s guess. 
Finally, courts are utterly ill-equipped to deal effectively with the 
settlement process, which they would have to supervise very closely to 
prevent settlements from producing “sweetheart deals” that expand 
compensatory damages and exclude punitive damages in order to de-
fraud insurers (whose policies often exclude coverage of punitive 
damages) or the state (who, like Oregon, sometimes gets a “take” of 
punitive damages), as Markel concedes.66 
Markel counters that punitive damages should be insurable.67  But 
would he mandate such insurance by statute?  If not, there are sound 
reasons related to “adverse selection” why insurers might want to ex-
clude Markel’s punitive damages from their contractual coverage—
 
63 Markel, How Should Punitive Damages Work?, supra note 46, at 1400-01; Markel, 
Retributive Damages, supra note 46, at 288-89. 
64 See id. at 289 (“With a corporation, we could look at the worth of the enterprise 
as measured by valuation models used on Wall Street.”). 
65 Markel, How Should Punitive Damages Work?, supra note 46, at 1458. 
66 Id. at 1471-76. 
67 Id. at 1477. 
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higher premiums would have to be charged to corporations with large 
amounts of equity, thereby exacerbating the incentive to overleverage. 
CONCLUSION 
Some cars require high-octane gasoline, while others need only 
regular.  Mid-grade gasoline, a “balanced” and “intermediate” solu-
tion, may in fact be optimal for virtually no vehicles.  Such is, alas, of-
ten the fate of compromises.  But mid-grade gasoline is at least noth-
ing but a mixture of low- and high-octane fuel.  The “compromise” of 
“intermediate” “retributive damages” is, to the contrary, more like 
mixing oil and water.  It is a balance of two incommensurables—
private and public ordering.  When this balancing occurs, private or-
dering is always the loser. 
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